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SOVEREIGN LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE OR DANGER-
OUS PLAN OR DESIGN-CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
CODE SECTION 830.6
In 1963 the California Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act.1
Government Code sections 830-40.6 govern public liability for danger-
ous or defective conditions of public property. The definitions of
dangerous condition and of public property are found in section 830,2
while section 8353 provides the basis for and the requisites of liability.
The Government Code specifies a number of immunities, one of which
is found in section 830.6 dealing with immunities for injuries resulting
from the plan or design of public property. Code section 830.64
provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this
chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction
of, or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design
has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by
the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or
employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or
where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards
previously so approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that
there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a rea-
sonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or
the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other
body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the
standards therefor.
The purpose of this note is to examine the legislative background and
1 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1, at 3267, contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
810-996.6.
2 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830 provides:
"(a) 'Dangerous condition' means a condition of property that creates a
substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of
injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a
manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.
"(b) 'Protect against' includes repairing, remedying or correcting a
dangerous condition, providing safeguards against a dangerous condition, and
warning of a dangerous condition.
"(c) 'Property of a public entity' and 'Public property' mean the real or
personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but do not include
easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property
of the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity."
3 CAL. GOVT CODE § 835 provides:
"Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused
by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the
property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the
injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which
was incurred, and that either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous con-
dition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition."
4 CAL. GOVT CODE § 830.6.
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policy of section 830.6, and to inquire whether recent judicial treat-
ment of the section is commensurate with, or in excess of, the appar-
ent legislative intent.
Judicial Treatment Prior to 1963
Under the California case law prior to the enactment of section
830.6 in 1963, the State was held liable for a dangerous condition
regardless of its having had no opportunity to remedy the condi-
tion.5 While the mere possiblity that public property could have
been made safer by other means was not sufficient to hold the
State i/able, 6 the court made it clear in Pritchard v. Sully-Miller
Contracting Company7 that, whether or not the municipality (City
of Long Beach) had notice, it would be held liable when, in accord
with an original plan, a dangerous condition had resulted. Thus
impliedly, even though a design might have been reasonable when
it was approved by an administrative decision, if an injury occurred
years later, the entity could be held liable on the basis that it had
created a dangerous condition. It is probable that cases such as
Pritchards prompted the legislature to enact section 830.6.
Public Policy Behind Section 830.6
The policy and theory underlying section 830.6 were explained
by the California Law Revision Commission as follows:
There should be immunity from liability for the plan or design of
public construction and improvements where the plan or design has
been approved by a governmental agency exercising discretionary
authority, unless there is no reasonable basis for such approval. While
it is proper to hold public entities liable for injuries caused by arbi-
trary abuses of discretionary authority in planning improvements, to
permit reexamination in tort litigation of particular discretionary
decisions where reasonable men may differ as to how the discretion
should be exercised would create too great a danger of impolitic inter-
ference with the freedom of decision-making by those public officials
in whom the function of making such decisions has been vested.9
Numerous policy arguments have been advanced in support of sec-
tion 830.6. It has been said that the provision represents an attempt
by the legislature, by providing specific immunity, to keep public
liability within ascertainable limits.10 An entity may not have an
5 Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 2d 196, 206, 157 P.2d 625, 630
(1945).
6 Belcher v. City & County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 2d 457, 463,
158 P.2d 996, 999 (1945).
7 178 Cal. App. 2d 246, 2 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1960). The court said: "The
elements of notice and failure to exercise reasonable diligence ordinarily are
essential to show culpability on the part of the city but where it has itself
created the dangerous condition it is per se culpable and notice, knowledge
and time for correction have become false quantities in the problem of liabil-
ity." Id. at 256, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 836 (emphasis added).
8 For similar cases, see Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 2d 196, 157
P.2d 625 (1945); Wise v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 2d 364, 49 P.2d 1122,
rehearing denied, 9 Cal. App. 2d 364, 367, 50 P.2d 1079 (1935).
9 4 CAL. LAW REVIsIoN COmm'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES
823 (1963).
10 Hink & Schutter, Some Thoughts on the American Law of Govern-
mental Tort Liability, 20 RuTGa s L. REv. 710, 742 (1966).
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adequate budget to meet the demands of sporadic liability from
lawsuits it has lost." It is thought that the spirit of public employees
may be so dampened by threats of lawsuits that programs urgently
needed by the general public would not be developed with antici-
pated promptness. 12 Furthermore, it has been contended that to sub-
mit the issue of negligence to a jury would as a practical matter,"make the public entity an insurer despite the best efforts of respon-
sible officials to eliminate every known condition posing a reasonable
probability of injury."'
3
The legislature, therefore, sought to protect the integrity of the
governmental decision process in the areas of planning and design,
future improvement, and construction of public property. Stated
otherwise, the objective of the legislation was "to locate the specific
boundaries within which tort liability may be imposed upon public
entities without unduly frustrating or interfering with the accom-
plishment of the other accepted ends for which the entities exist."'I4
In its construction of section 830.6 the California Supreme Court has
recognized the need to protect the public official, 15 but in doing so
the court may have granted broader immunity than was intended by
the legislature or than is consistent with public safety.
Judicial Treatment of Section 830.6
Two recent California cases which illustrate conflicting ap-
proaches to section 830.6 are Cabell v. State16 and Douglas v. State.17
In Cabell, notwithstanding the State's having had notice and oppor-
tunity to remedy a dangerous condition, the supreme court granted
the State immunity.
While Cabell was residing in a San Francisco State College dormi-
tory, he received serious injuries when his hand slipped through a
glass lavatory door he was opening. The glass was not of the safety
variety, but had been approved in 1957 when the original design for
state dormitories had been adopted. The door recently had been re-
placed with the same quality of glass following a similar mishap in-
volving another student. In addition, a lavatory door on the same
floor a month earlier and a lavatory door on another floor the previ-
ous year had been replaced after contact with students' hands caused
the doors to break' i8
The trial court sustained the State's motion for summary judg-
ment.19 On review the intermediate court overturned the summary
proceeding and held the State liable, declaring, "While section 830.6
" Kefmedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Immunity,
36 S. CAL. L. REv. 161, 179 (1963).
12 Van Alstyne, Tort Liability-A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 463, 472 (1963).
13 5 CAL. LAW'REVisION COMm''N, REPORTs, RECOMVIENDATIONS & STUDIES
346 (1963).
14 Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 472.
15 Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967).
16 Id.
17 252 A.C.A. 477, 60 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1967).
18 67 A.C. at 177-78, 430 P.2d at 36-37, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
19 67 A.C. 174, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476.
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of the Government Code may bar a cause of action based on a faulty
plan or design, it should not bar a cause based on the negligent main-
tenance of the door in its original condition after the State had notice
of its dangerous characteristics. '20 Cabell's vindication, however,
was short-lived. In reversing, the supreme court held: "We are
persuaded that there is no merit in this contention [the alleged main-
tenance of a dangerous condition]. . . . [T] he plan or design is
to be judged as of the time it was adopted or approved."21 Thus,
the State, with knowledge of and an opportunity to remedy the dan-
gerous condition, avoided liability for a present defective condition
of public property because the design for the building had been ap-
proved years before plaintiff's accident.2 2 Justice Peters, with whom
Justice Tobriner concurred, wrote a strong dissent arguing that the
legislature had indicated its intent to adopt an approach to liability
similar to New York's and that the State should be held liable after




Accompanying section 830.6 is a Law Revision Commission Com-
ment. As a general rule only the Legislative Committee Comments
are valid sources for legislative intent,24 but the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary and the Assembly Committee on Ways and Means
formally adopted the Law Revision Comments as indicating legisla-
tive intent.25 The germane comment provides that the immunity of
section 830.6 is to be similar to the immunity described in the New
York case, Weiss v. Fote.
26
20 Cabell v. State, 55 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (1966), vacated, 67 A.C. 174, 430
P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967).
21 67 A.C. at 178-79, 430 P.2d at 37, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
22 Becker v. Johnston, 67 A.C. 187, 430 P.2d 43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967),
illustrates the extreme to which the court will carry the rule of Cabell that
the original date of adoption provides the standard whereby the reasonableness
of a present known dangerous condition is to be assessed. Against Sacramento
County, a cross-defendant, Becker alleged negligent design and failure to
maintain a county highway in a safe condition. There had been prior acci-
dents; the highway was admittedly in a dangerous condition; the government
had notice of the condition; but there was no liability. The court relied on the
approval of the highway design, July 11, 1927. The highway had remained
in the same design until the accident in 1963. A portion of the substantial
evidence, which under section 830.6 is necessary to establish the reasonable-
ness of the original design, revealed that when the highway was built horses
and buggies traveled the road at a time well before the advent of schools,
shopping centers and homes throughout the immediate area. Thus, the State
was allowed to ignore significant changes in conditions which affected the
appropriateness of the highway design to meet the modem needs of safety.
The State was allowed to ignore a series of accidents adequate to apprise it
of the existing dangerous condition.
23 Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 179, 430 P.2d 34, 37, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476,
479 (1967).
24 A. VAN ALST"N, CAL FoNiA Gov-RNmENTAL TORT IjABiLTY 120 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar, 1964).
25 1963 JouirA OF THE SENATH, Reg. Sess. 1885; 1963 JOuR AL OF TE
AssEMNLY, Reg. Sess. 5439.
26 "The immunity provided by Section 830.6 is similar to an immunity
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In Weiss v. Fote27 plaintiff alleged that because the City of Buf-
falo negligently designed traffic signals, he had sustained injuries in
an automobile collision. Regarding the negligence in the design, the
court held in favor of the city in deference to a long-established tra-
dition of noninterference with the "ordinary performance of planning
functions by the officials to whom those functions were entrusted."28
But more significantly, while also finding that there had been no
previous accidents or changed conditions such as would have alerted
the city to a defective condition, the court observed that "[i]t is
proper and necessary to hold municipalities and the State liable for
injuries arising out of the day-by-day operations of government, for
instance, the garden variety injury resulting from the negligent main-
tenance of a highway. . . ."29 Judge Fuld, in distinguishing an
earlier decision,30 made it clear that although the State would be
immune for the plan or design function, it would be subject to a con-
tinuing duty to keep public property safe:
[It is] the rule that, once having planned the intersection, the State
was under a continuing duty to review its plan in the light of its
actual operation and that the proof established a breach of such a
duty. More particularly, the court considered, as sufficient to demon-
strate a violation of the State's continuing obligation to maintain the
safety of the highways, evidence that physical conditions had changed
at the intersection and that a number of accidents had occurred after
the stop sign had been removed. In the case before us, however the
situation is quite different; there is no showing that the continuing
obligation which rested on the municipality was violated. There is
no proof either of changed conditions or of accidents at the intersec-
tion which would have required the city to modify the signal light"clearance interval."3 '
Thus, the opinion of the New York court resolves a fundamental
conflict. By preserving the policy of noninterference with public
planning, it insures that the discretion of governmental officials may
be freely exercised. But the case also stands for the complementary
conclusion that a state may be liable for negligence in the operation
of an approved plan after the state has had adequate notice of an
unsafe condition.
3 2
It would appear that the majority in Cabell failed to apply the
principles of Weiss to circumstances which the New York court spec-
ified as grounds for possible liability. Cabell's injury occurred
after a series of similar accidents; the State had actual notice of the
that has been granted by judicial decision to public entities in New York.
See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960)."
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
27 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
28 Id. at 584, 167 N.E.2d at 65, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
29 Id. at 585, 167 N.E.2d at 65-66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
30 Eastman v. State of New York, 303 N.Y. 691, 103 N.E.2d 56 (1951).
31 7 N.Y.2d at 587-88, 167 N.E.2d at 67, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
32 See Court of Appeals, 1959 Term, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 48, 209-10 (1960)
where it was said, "[n] or is there any question that the State is liable for the
negligence of its employees on the purely operational level .... A municipal-
ity owes the public a duty of keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition
for travel. Included in this duty is the subordinate duty to plan intersections
and for failure to plan or to review a plan when it is shown to be unsafe the
municipality may be liable." And see 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 366 (1960).
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danger; and the State failed to correct the condition.33 Particularly,
the majority disregarded the Weiss decision by holding that immunity
under section 830.6 attaches with respect to "ordinary routine main-
tenance of public property,"3 4 whereas, the New York court had pre-
scribed liability for dangerous conditions in "day-by-day mainten-
ance."
35
Given the apparent legislative intent to adopt the reasoning of
Weiss v. Fote, which is still followed in New York,3 6 it is interesting
that the majority in Cabell did not mention Weiss but instead relied
upon the views of Professor Van Alstyne:
The reasonableness of adoption or approval of the design, plan, or
standards is measured as of the time the adoption or approval
occurred. A plan or design now judged to have been reasonable
when adopted is not actionable even though its defective nature
is considered wholly unreasonable under present circumstances and
conditions.
3 7
While the Professor's opinion is of course entitled to great respect, it
must be observed that his views were neither supported by judicial
authority nor reflective of the legislative intent found in the com-
ment to section 830.6.38
33 Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 178-79, 430 P.2d 34, 37, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476,
479 (1967).
34 Id. at 179, 430 P.2d at 37, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
35 7 N.Y.2d at 585, 167 N.E.2d at 65-66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
30 In clarification of Weiss, subsequent New York cases have reiterated
the same principles of liability. In Warda v. State, 45 Misc. 2d 385, 256
N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1964), the court reaffirmed the liability possible for
maintenance or operation, after holding that the State was not liable because
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. The court said, "This is not to say
that ... the State does not have the continuing obligation to restudy, to re-
design, to continually search for better and safer highways and to make those
already constructed better and safer where needed." Id. at 389, 256 N.Y.S.2d
at 1011. In Natina v. Westchester County Park Comm'n, 49 Misc. 2d 573,
268 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1966), the contention that the state has a duty to
keep its property safe was supported when the court labeled a case, with no
prior accidents nor any change in conditions as "an attempt to get beyond the
purview of Weiss." Id. at 575, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 416. This lack of notice situa-
tion was distinguished from the liability attaching to everyday operation of
government facilities. Where the state fulfilled its continuing duty to keep
property safe, by testing periodically to insure that it was safe and all was
working properly, it was within the scope of the immunity in Weiss v. Fote.
Squadrito v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 758, 229 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
37 Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 177, 430 P.2d 34, 36, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476, 478
(1967), quoting A. VA ArTsTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT LiABmITY
556 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar, 1964).
38 Accepting the reasoning of Weiss v. Fote, it is still possible that the
court misintrepreted Professor Van Alstyne's statement. It is consistent with
Weiss that if the public entity had no notice of the dangerous condition, the
reasonableness of the condition would be judged as of the time of adoption,
even though the dangerous condition was wholly unreasonable under present
conditions. It is interesting to note that Professor Van Alstyne, as the re-
search consultant for the Law Revision Commission, elsewhere applied the
reasoning of Weiss in a discussion of liability for failure to adopt police
regulations or precautions. In this area of nonfeasance he said, "In the
absence of known physically dangerous or defective property conditions-
with respect to which negligent failures to remedy or warn have long been
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Weiss, as contended by Appellant in Douglas, is
an official gloss upon the intentions of the draftsmen of the new code
provision .... Thus, the similarity between Weiss v. Fote and
Government Code Section 830.6 derives from their common, central
concern with an institutional problem, namely, the demarcation line
between the executive and judicial spheres in relation to professional
decision making by engineers.8 9
The Weiss rule endeavors to guarantee an unfettered environment
in which experts can plan and design public property, by allowing
experts the freedom to contrive schemes for future construction
and improvements of state property; simultaneously, it attempts to
promote public safety by imposing a continuing duty to inspect and
remedy dangerous conditions of state property. Accordingly, it is
submitted that the California Supreme Court should have applied the
principles of the Weiss case to the facts in Cabell in its determination
of the immunity under 830.6. Allowing a determination of the neg-
ligence issue would have been more consistent with the expressed
intention in the comment. Presently, California furnishes the designer
of public property with an unfettered environment, but what of the
complementary duty to provide safe public property?
An Alternative to Cabell v. State
In Douglas v. State40 the plaintiff brought an action against the
State for injuries suffered by him in a collision occurring upon a
public freeway. The basis of plaintiff's claim was that the State, by
its negligent design of the highway, had created a hazardous condi-
tion. The court of appeal for the fourth district, in an opinion by
Associate Justice Whelan, developed an approach to section 830.6 that
is similar to the view expressed in Weiss. The State would be ex-
cused from liability for the reasonable adoption of a plan or design,
but it would encounter liability for a breach of the continuing duty
to maintain and operate public property in a safe condition.
According to Douglas a dangerous condition resulting from an
executed design would be grounds for liability, provided that the
State had adequate notice of the condition. 41 The court distinguished
two classes of liability: one based upon the design and another based
upon the placing of the design into operation.42 Liability of the latter
category is predicated upon a continuing duty to operate the design
in a safe manner.
As viewed by Justice Whelan, section 835 of the Government
Code provides the limits and conditions of liability for dangerous and
actionable under the Public Liability Act-it would seem that the New York
court's reasoning [in Weiss v. Fote] constitutes a persuasive basis for reject-
ing liability for such inaction." CAL. LAW REVISION COmm'N, supra note 13,
at 442-43. Impliedly then, Professor Van Alstyne would condone liability for
such nonfeasance when the entity had knowledge of the danger. If notice
here would confer liability, why should it not have the same effect for
dangerous public property?
39 Appellant's Closing Brief at 4-5, Douglas v. State, 252 A.C.A. 477, 60
Cal. Rptr. 694 (1967).
40 252 A.C.A. 477, 60 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1967).
41 Id. at 485, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
42 Id.
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defective public property.43 Plaintiff, under 835, must establish
either a negligent or wrongful act, or that the public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the danger under section 835.2.
44
Yet, after a court has found substantial evidence of a reasonable
basis for approving the original design, section 830.6 would provide
immunity for the State where liability is predicated upon a negligent
or wrongful act.4 5 Likewise, the State would not be liable under
835(b) for notice in creating the plan, since mere adoption, protected
by section 830.6, would not provide actual or constructive notice.
46
Thus, the State could not be liable for the reasonable adoption alone.
Justice Whelan stated in summary, the well-reasoned rule:
Where an initial case of exemption under section 830.6 had been
established, subsequent liability under section 835 must rest upon
constructive notice as defined by section 835.2(b) by proof that the
demonstrated hazard had been made manifest for a sufficient period
of time to charge defendant with notice, or upon proof of actual
notice of such demonstrated hazard under subdivision (a) of section
835.2, Government Code.47
Douglas presents a sound construction of section 830.6 that is
consistent with the policy of protecting the State from liability where
the defect arises from a mere error of judgment and where the plan
is not patently defective as a matter of law. Further, in its practical
result, Douglas serves as an example of a case in which the State
was not liable. The court found that plaintiff failed to prove that
the freeway design was demonstrably dangerous in its operation.
48
Plaintiff proved no facts to support actual or constructive notice.
He was left with only the allegation of an inherent defect,49 for
43 252 A.C.A. at 487-88, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
44 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835.2 provides:
"(a) A public entity had actual notice of a dangerous condition within
the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 if it had actual knowledge of
the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dan-
gerous character.
"(b) A public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition
within the meaning of subdivision (b) of Section 835 only if the plaintiff
establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was
of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care,
should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. On the
issue of due care, admissible evidence includes but is not limited to evidence
as to:
"(1) Whether the existence of the condition and its dangerous character
would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably
adequate (considering the practicability and cost of inspection weighed against
the likelihood and magnitude of the potential danger to which failure to
inspect would give rise) to inform the public entity whether the property
was safe for the use or uses for which the public entity used or intended
others to use the public property and for uses that the public entity actually
knew others were making of the public property or adjacent property.
"(2) Whether the public entity maintained and operated such an inspec-
tion system with due care and did not discover the condition."
45 252 A.C.A. at 488, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 488-89, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
48 252 A.C.A. at 490, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
49 Justice Whelan distinguished "inherent hazard" from "demonstrable
hazard," the former being a "possible innate but undiscovered hazard in an
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which section 830.6 provided immunity in view of the prior reason-
able approval.
Justice Whelan's approach in Douglas is not unlike Cabell's argu-
ment that the State, after approving a plan of design had a duty to
"maintain" public property in a safe condition.50 One difference which
may be significant is that the Douglas view is not susceptible to the
semantic argument made by the State in its answer to Cabell's peti-
tion for a rehearing in the supreme court.5 ' There, the State argued
that its duty to "maintain" public property was fullfilled by preserv-
ing the property in conformity with the original plan or design.
2
If that design was shown to be dangerous in its operation, the State
might nevertheless "maintain" it according to the approved specifi-
cations. This latter argument clearly subverts the spirit of Weiss.
While it would only be conjecture whether the supreme court gave
credence to the State's argument, it is clear that the court disregarded
the principle in Weiss pertaining to a continuing duty to keep prop-
erty in an operable, safe condition.
The Douglas approach, supported by authority in other jurisdic-
tions,53 would establish no new liability for governmental agencies in
California; it would correspond to the apparent intent of the legisla-
ture. Such an approach would provide liability for a breach of a con-
approved design," and the latter being "a hazard that has been demonstrated
in the use of an improvement executed according to the approved design."
252 A.C.A. at 485, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
50 67 A.C. at 178-79, 430 P.2d at 37, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
51 State's Answer to Petition for Rehearing at 1-2, Cabell v. State, 67
A.C. 174, 430 P.2d 34, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967).
52 Id.
53 Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721, 731 (S.D. Tenn. 1955), "Once
the decision was made to construct substations and bring in power, all of
the discretion required has already been exercised .... [I]t became the
duty of the government and its agents and employees to exercise due care in
carrying out the program decided upon." In Perrotti v. Bennett, 94 Conn.
533, 541, 109 A. 890, 893 (1920), where plaintiff alleged the negligent con-
struction and maintenance of a highway, it was said: "The court should not
attempt to control the decision of the municipal authorities in their choice
of a plan of public improvement. It should not penalize an error of judgment
.... But it should hold the municipality liable for the continued operation
and maintenance of the improvement under the defective plan after it had
reasonable notice of the defect and of the imminence of the injury." In
Johnston v. East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 466, 91 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1950), it was
said: "A municipal corporation acts judicially or exercises discretion when
it selects and adopts a plan in the making of public improvements, but as
soon as it begins to carry out that plan it acts ministerially and is bound to
see that the work is done in a reasonably safe and skillful manner." Further
support is found in Paul v. Faricey, 228 Minn. 264, 274, 37 N.W.2d 427, 433
(1949), where the court said that the adoption of the original plan was
immune from liability, but that after the plan had been executed the city
had to keep the improvement in a reasonably safe condition. Recently, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Raisanen v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d
504, -, 151 N.W.2d 129, 134 & n.5 (1967), stated: "Lawfully authorized pro-
graming of signal lights by a city should not give rise to tort liability by a
jury second guessing the reasonableness and safety of the plan. ... [F]ailure
to maintain a traffic sign may give rise to a cause of action against a munici-
pality."
[Vol. 19THE HASTINGS LAkW JOURNAL
tinuing duty to operate in a safe condition, whether the defective con-
dition arises from the daily use of government property or from a
structural defect of the property.
Conclusion
While the Law Revision Commission was conducting the study
on sovereign immunity it received many letters from district attor-
neys and other concerned parties throughout the State. Although
various parties were opposed to state liability for diverse reasons, the
minutes of the Commission's meetings as well as the communications
from interested parties clearly disclose that they assumed and ac-
cepted imposition of some liability for the designed and approved
construction and improvements.5 4 A few parties expressed particu-
lar apprehension of liability arising from an unexpected event (e.g.,
an extraordinary flood).55 As to such fears an approach to section
830.6 consistent with Weiss would protect the integrity of the reason-
able design decision, while the traditional process whereby the jury
weighs the relative risks and burdens in a negligence case would
eliminate liability for the unforeseeable event.
One purpose of the specific immunities in the California Tort
Claims Act was to eliminate unfounded litigation and the expense
which would accrue from speculative litigation if the terms of im-
munity were generally stated.56 Yet, it would be unreasonable in
view of the comment to 830.6 to expect that the claims of all litigants
54 Letter from California Department of Finance to California Law Re-
vision Commission, June 7, 1962, attached to Memorandum 46 of the California
Law Revision Commission, 1962 (unpublished memorandum in the office of
the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford Univer-
sity): "Some state property is acquired, improved and maintained for use by
members of the public who are expressly or impliedly invited to use particular
areas of such state property for specified purposes .... highways, colleges,
hospitals, parks, state office buildings. The State, in common with other
property owners, should operate and maintain such property so as to provide
reasonably safe places for proper use by those who are invited to use such
property." Letter from the League of California Cities to the California Law
Revision Commission, August 2, 1962, attached to Memorandum 46, at 2, of
the California Law Revision Commission, 1962 (unpublished memorandum
in the office of the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law,
Stanford University): "It would appear desirable to limit liability for negli-
gence of public officers and employees to maintenance .... Imposing liability
for design would, in our opinion, result in an almost complete inability to
pinpoint individual responsibilties." In Minutes of the California Law Re-
vision Commission meeting, September 21-22, 1962, on file at the office of
the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford University,
at 11, "Liability will exist under section 830.6 because of the improper per-
formance of some functions."
55 Letter from County Counsel of Los Angeles County to California Law
Revision Commission, September 28, 1962, attached to Memorandum 63 of
the California Law Revision Commission, 1962 (unpublished memorandum in
the office of the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford
University).
56 See Minutes of the California Law Revision Commission meeting,
November 10-11, 1961, at 27, on file at the office of the California Law Re-
vision Commission, School of Law, Stanford University.
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would be silenced. Through the enactment of 830.6 it was recognized
that the State is not on equal footing with private entities and should
have some immunities. The faultless citizen, however, should not
be left without remedy for injuries received after the public entity
had notice of the defective nature of its property and failed to remedy
the condition, merely because of prior approval of the plan. There
must be a limit on the immunity for plan or design; an individual must
not be forced in all cases to table his claims of negligence and re-
linquish all compensatory redress.
The Cabell decision represents a determination that the worth
of protecting the integrity of plans or designs approved upon rea-
sonable grounds at an earlier date, outweighs the responsibility to
provide adequate redress to a citizen who through no fault of his own
is injured due to a known dangerous condition of public property.
This policy decision does not merely tip a delicate balance between
two conflicting meritorious public policies; it abrogates the policy
that the state must provide reasonably safe premises for its citizens.
The rationale of Weiss v. Fote as implemented and made work-
able through the construction of 830.6 in Douglas v. State should be
sustained. The liability should attach by reason of the failure to cor-
rect and not by reason of the adoption of the plan. The plan or de-
sign, as Cabell said in his reply, should not be thrust into perpetuity;
"[t] he State should not be allowed to use the shield given to the archi-
tect in his lonely office. When the State maintains [operates with




57 Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Cabell v. State, 67 A.C. 174, 430 P.2d 34,
60 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967).
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